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‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ hierarchy between the economic growth of Germany, which leads to 
precarious, ‘financialised’ growth in the periphery. Yet, this article shows that core-periphery 
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argument that Germany is to blame for the origins of the eurozone crisis in the individual 
countries of the European Periphery. This article shows that by bringing core-periphery 
analysis into dialogue with Comparative Political Economy, a critical approach to the Eurozone 
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I show that imbalances between the core and periphery are a product of a flawed 
construction of the Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union. 
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Introduction: The ‘PIIGS’ and the German ‘big bad wolf’ 
Much like their namesakes in the fairy tale, the (regrettably labelled) European ‘PIIGS1’ have 
been widely understood to have built their houses out of straw. As the story goes, the causes 
of the eurozone crisis originate from the supposed hubris, profligacy, corruption, and general 
lack of mature political culture in countries of the European periphery.2 However, the above 
‘immaturity thesis’ (Dooley 2014) is increasingly and strongly challenged by a number of 
approaches which cast Germany as the ‘big bad wolf’ of the tale (see especially Lapavitsas et 
al. 2012). While the above notions of peripheral ‘immaturity’ remain widespread and 
influential, somewhat surprisingly, scholars have noted that narratives expressed in Western 
media have increasingly focused on the problems with Germany’s, rather than the European 
periphery’s behaviour (Cross and Ma 2015; Adler-Nissen 2015, Lapavitsas and Flassbeck 
2016). On the one hand, Germany has been portrayed as iron-fisted and intransigent in its 
handling of the crisis (Cross and Ma 2015), as irrationally committing to its ordoliberal values 
even when this commitment threatens the very existence of the European project (Matthijs 
2016a). On the other hand, Germany is accused of causing the crisis in the first place by 
‘beggaring its neighbour’ in the European periphery in order to reproduce its export-led 
model of growth, and of uniquely and perhaps deliberately benefitting from the euro at the 
inevitable expense of its fellow member states (Lapavitsas et al. 2012; Moravcsik 2012). The 
centrality of Germany in the origins, escalation, and intractability of the crisis has become 
more and more commonplace in ongoing debates. By replacing one scapegoat with another, 
this ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ narrative aims to challenge existing assumptions by blaming the 
German ‘big bad wolf’ instead of the ‘PIIGS’. 
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As welcome as challenges are to the ‘immaturity thesis’, this paper shows that 
‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ narratives are just as problematic, and indeed, run into many of the 
same problems as narratives of peripheral ‘immaturity’. While the immaturity thesis has 
staged a problematic morality play between Northern ‘saints’ and Southern ‘sinners’ 
(Matthijs and McNamara 2015; Fourcade 2013; Adler-Nissen 2015), ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ 
narratives will be shown to similarly preoccupied with narratives of blame, and lacking in 
empirical support. The key contribution of this article is to show that that critical literature on 
the eurozone crisis can, and should, move beyond assumptions of Germany as the ‘big bad 
wolf’ in order to open up the space for the development a genuinely critical rethinking of the 
origins of the eurozone crisis. Namely, I show how a specific project of European integration 
– rather than German domination - has been generative of debt led growth and falling 
competitiveness in the European periphery. 
This paper comprises of three main sections. The first section reviews the key claims 
made by literature which prioritises the role of core EMU, especially Germany, in the origins 
of the eurozone crisis and interprets core-periphery analysis as consisting of three analytical 
steps. Section two presents empirical evidence; namely typically overlooked, country-specific 
trade balances and capital flows between the Core EMU countries (Germany, France, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands) and the periphery (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain). From 
this I present two important conclusions. One, far from ‘beggaring its neighbour’, there is little 
evidence for a link between the economic success of core EMU or Germany and the 
competitiveness problems faced by the European periphery. Two, although Germany was an 
important lender to the periphery in the run up to the crisis, it was often not the most 
important. Capital flows have always been a bigger problem than Germany alone. The final 
section proposes a way forward for core-periphery analysis by rethinking its key analytical 
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steps. I show that jettisoning the problematic ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ assumptions can 
deepen existing debates on the core and periphery and the eurozone crisis. I show how this 
is possible through the closer engagement of critical perspectives with Comparative Political 
Economists such as Alison Johnston (2016), Bob Hancké (2013), and others (including 
Johnston and Regan 2016; Hall 2012; 2014; Regan 2015; Lapavitsas and Powell 2013). Core-
periphery analysis can provide a compelling critique of the institutional set up of EMU and 
the Single Market if its preoccupations with Germany are left behind. Naturally, we cannot 
fully understand the eurozone crisis without engaging in debates surrounding German power, 
current account imbalances, international capital flows, and issues around hegemony and 
inequality in Europe. I show that moving beyond assumptions of Germany as the ‘big bad 
wolf’ is necessary to open up the space for the development a genuinely critical rethinking of 
these important issues. 
 
Huffing and puffing: Germany and ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ narratives  
In late December 2013, responding disapprovingly to a question regarding relief on Ireland’s 
bank debt, former European Commission President José Manuel Barroso rearticulated a 
familiar narrative of the eurozone crisis. The euro was the ‘victim’ of irresponsible economic 
and political governance in the periphery, rather than the other way around (Independent.ie 
2013). Barroso’s answer is underpinned by the ‘immaturity thesis’; an explanation of the 
causes of the eurozone crisis which places the perceived failings of the European periphery at 
the heart of its analysis. Emerging early in the crisis as the ‘winning narrative’ (Matthijs and 
McNamara 2015, 230), the immaturity thesis was embraced in Germany and by wider political 
and public discourse. It shut down plausible counter-narratives of what went wrong and 
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ended up driving the initial debate and solutions offered; namely ‘long overdue’ pain and 
penance for the fiscally immature ‘PIIGS’ (ibid; Fourcade 2013).   
If not refuted nor declining in influence, the immaturity thesis has been 
comprehensively challenged in existing literature. It has been criticised (non-exhaustively) for 
its neglect of the international dimensions of the crisis (Dooley 2014), a myopic focus on 
peripheral exceptionalism (Tsakalotos 2014), for contributing to xenophobia towards the so-
called ‘PIIGS’ (Lavdas, Litsas, and Skiadas 2013, 175; Kouvélakis 2012, xix; Marder 2012), self-
fulfilling prophecies of negative market reaction3 (Brazys and Hardiman 2013), and clearly 
damaging policy prescriptions which even the IMF has admitted on now multiple occasions 
were a mistake.4  
In part as a response to the above limitations, a number of important alternatives to 
the immaturity thesis have emerged in recent years. It has especially been challenged by 
approaches which view core euro area countries5, but especially Germany, as the ‘big bad 
wolf’ of the story; focusing on how Northern economic dominance of the eurozone 
contributed directly or indirectly to the so-called ‘PIIGS’ vulnerabilities. In this section I outline 
the different strands of this challenge to the immaturity thesis, before zooming in on the key 
analytical steps of ‘core-periphery analysis’, which represents the most exacting critique of 
Germany’s role in the crisis.  
Germany, the Core, and the Eurozone Crisis 
Three major strands of argument can be identified regarding Germany’s role in the eurozone 
crisis. The first strand focuses on the ways in which Germany’s problematic response to the 
eurozone crisis is a big part of the reasons why the crisis took on the magnitude that it did.6 
Matthijs (2016a), for instance, outlines a number of episodes where German politicians’ 
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stubborn preference for the ‘southern sinners’ myth measurably contributed to acute 
instances of negative market reaction (Matthijs cites five episodes, see his 2016a piece). It is 
also well known that German politicians, economists, and powerful institutions such as the 
Bundesbank and Constitutional Court worked to prevent the ECB from playing the ‘lender of 
last resort’ role that the Federal Reserve had in the USA in 2008 and 2009 (Matthijs and Blyth 
2011). The ECB did eventually fulfil this role, but many insist that German delays and 
obstruction allowed the crisis to develop on a scale and scope that it likely wouldn’t have 
otherwise (see Wren-Lewis 2015). Thompson (2013; 2015) draws attention to how highly 
vulnerable core banks viewed the crisis in the periphery as an opportunity to shift ‘the risk of 
default in the periphery from German and French banks to collective European and other 
taxpayers’ (Thompson 2013, 7). Others such as Bulmer (2014) have contributed to vibrant 
debates on whether post eurozone-crisis, Germany is emerging as a hegemon, reluctantly or 
otherwise.7  
The second strand outlines a more systematic approach, showing how various actions 
and institutions of Germany, the European periphery, and EMU culminated in a perfect storm. 
This approach has its origins in Comparative Political Economy (CPE) and does not typically 
directly refer to Germany ‘beggaring its neighbour’ (in contrast to below strand), but rather 
directs attention to an unfit for purpose project of monetary integration which suited the core 
‘coordinated market economies’ yet was intrinsically damaging for peripheral ‘mixed market 
economies’ (Johnston 2016, Hancké 2013, Hall 2012; 2014). I outline this approach in greater 
detail in section 3. 
The third strand argues that not only did Germany benefit from EMU and make a bad 
situation worse, but that it directly caused the crisis in the periphery in the first place. As 
7 
 
distinct from the other strands which tend to identify root causes at the level of the euro and 
typically emphasise the negative symbiosis of both core and peripheral institutions (Hall 
2014), this critical approach places the blame squarely at the feet of the core; although more 
often than not, it is the role of Germany which steals the headlines. While core-periphery 
analysis is not just about Germany, nevertheless, it is Germany that tends to get singled out 
by this analysis as the main offender. It is this latter and most demanding strand which will 
be the main focus of this article. Originating from critical political economy (Lapavitsas et al. 
2012; Stockhammer 2011), perspectives as diverse as Keynesian (Patomäki 2013; Wolf 2014) 
post-Keynesian (Dejuán et al. 2013; Cesaratto 2013) and neo-Gramscian (van Apeldoorn 
2012) have taken up core-periphery assumptions in their work. The approach has since ‘gone 
mainstream’. Jose Magone, Brigid Laffan, and Christian Schweiger (2016) have recently 
published an edited volume which explores core-periphery relations in the EU from a variety 
of perspectives (but see especially Sepos 2016). Andrew Moravcsik’s widely cited 2012 piece 
is one of the most prominent mainstream appropriations of Lapavitsas et al.’s original 
argument, and Dani Rodrik (2013), Jörg Bibow (2012), Simon Wren-Lewis (2015) Paul 
Krugman (2013a; 2013b) Martin Wolf (2010), Joseph Stiglitz (2016 254-256), Yanis Varoufakis 
(2017, 23) and Robert Skidelsky (2014) have all popularised the argument.  
As evidenced by its wide take-up from a disparate range of perspectives, German 
‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ notions have emerged as a much needed alternative and touchstone 
for critical perspectives wishing to challenge the still influential peripheral ‘immaturity’ thesis. 
Yet, there has been a clear reluctance from within critical literature on the eurozone crisis to 
interrogate narratives of Germany ‘beggaring its neighbour’, as argued elsewhere (Dooley 
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2014).8 Lapavitsas and Flassbeck have gone so far as to accuse a recent criticism of their 
approach (Storm 2016) of ‘sowing confusion’: 
Heterodox voices in Europe certainly need conviction… but they need clarity even 
more. …Simply put, there could be no coherent explanation of Eurozone failure that 
left diverging nominal unit labour costs [between Germany and the periphery] out of 
account (2016). 
 
In contrast, I show that critical or heterodox perspectives on the origins of the eurozone crisis 
have much to gain from interrogating, and ultimately, from jettisoning ‘beggar-thy-
neighbour’ narratives. To show this, I first present core-periphery analysis as involving three 
key analytical steps. Before showing their limits in section two, and the potential of a revised 
set of analytical steps in section three, these three analytical steps are explored in turn. 
 
Step-1: Tailoring Europe to Germany 
The first step focuses on how the ‘uploading’ of German values to the EU level contributed to 
the emergence of the eurozone crisis in the first place.9 As Matthijs (2016a, 389) notes, 
Germany was only willing to abandon its highly symbolic Deutschemark and Bundesbank and 
participate in EMU if the rest of Europe agreed to create the euro in a German ordoliberal 
image (see also Heipertz and Verdun 2004; De Grauwe 1996, 1094). As a result, a ‘one size 
fits all’ model of European integration was designed with German interests firmly in mind 
(Thompson 2013).  
Tailoring EMU to Germany contributed to the origins of the eurozone crisis in a 
number of ways. The design flaws of EMU are well known; it was constructed with ‘forgotten’ 
financial, fiscal, and governance unions (Mathhijs and Blyth 2015, 1-2), it removed sovereignty 
of monetary policy from peripheral states, prevented them from making use of currency 
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devaluations, and imposed a single, blanket interest rate which was always too low for 
countries that are booming and too high for those in recession.10  
In addition, while all European economies attempted to adjust to the emerging 
institutions and arrangements of ‘German Europe’ (Beck 2013) not all were capable of doing 
so successfully (Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 4; Bellofiore et al. 2010, 136). Crucially, the periphery 
was unable to emulate the German model of excessive wage moderation and low inflation 
and thus lost competitiveness and generated current account deficits (Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 
4). 
This first step shows a foundational inequality in the ‘one size fits all’ architecture of 
EMU which skews in favour of the core, and against the periphery. A particular implication is 
important to note at this step of the argument. It is not analytically necessary to establish any 
kind of co-constitutive interaction between the core, or Germany, and periphery.  Rather, it 
is enough to recognise that the common pressure of European integration imposed different 
kinds and levels of costs across the core and periphery (Thompson 2013; Stockhammer 2012). 
Although most writers take the ‘core-periphery’ thesis beyond this first step, I show in the 
following sections that there is no imperative to do so, and a preferable alternative departure 
point exists which focuses on the asymmetric impact of European integration, rather than 
German ‘domination’.11 
Step-2: Current account imbalances 
The second step focuses on current account imbalances and begins to explain the interaction 
between the ‘export-led’ core and the ‘debt-led’ periphery by more explicitly outlining how 
EMU has ‘facilitated the domination of the eurozone by Germany at the expense of the 
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peripheral economies’ (Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 4). Moravcsik (2012) and others focus on 
relative unit labour costs (4-6; and see also Lapavitsas at al. 2012; Bellofiore 2013). During the 
period of their euro-membership Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain saw their unit labour costs 
rise by one percent per year over target, slowly rendering their economies uncompetitive. 
During the very same period Germany experienced sluggish wage growth, weak domestic 
consumption, labour market reforms, and cuts in government spending. The result was that 
German unit labour costs rose by average of less than one percent a year, well below the 
European Central Bank inflation target of 2 percent (Moravcsik 2012, 4).12 For Moravcsik this 
competitiveness gap is about much more than Germany reaping the ‘well deserved fruit of a 
decade of domestic reform and restraint’, rather, ‘Germanys wage suppression was excessive, 
fuelling both trade imbalances and imprudent international lending… Bankruptcy in southern 
Europe and prosperity in Germany are two sides of the same coin’ (Moravcsik 2012, 4-6; 
Flassbeck and Lapavitsas 2015,32). 
The economic success of Germany is understood to be made possible due to EMU 
being characterised by a structural balance of payments asymmetry between the core and 
periphery. ‘In other words’, as Young and Semmler write in their own account of this position: 
[C]ountries with current account surpluses need countries with current account 
deficits. This is particularly true in the Eurozone where there is no mechanism for tax 
and transfer policies to provide for regional equalization and stability as is the case in 
federal countries like the U.S… [t]hus the Eurozone could not function at all if all 
members tried to emulate Germany ([emphasis added] (2011,9).  
Thus, current account deficits in the periphery are understood to be the ‘mirror’ of 
Germany’s current account surpluses (Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 4). As Moravscik puts it, ‘[f]orty 
percent of [Germany’s trade surplus] comes from German trade with the eurozone – a total 
roughly equal to the combined deficits of the crisis countries’ (2012, 4; Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 
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30;see also Stiglitz 2016, 253). EMU created the conditions whereby Europe as a whole 
became ‘the primary market supporting Germany’s positive net exports and profits for its big 
business…[and] these economic policies and industrial behaviours were the pillars of the 
resurrection of Germany’s export-led capitalism during the 2000s’ (Bellofiore 2013, 504).  
Moreover, because the competitiveness of Germany’s export model rests on low-
wages, low inflation and low domestic consumption, Germany has effectively exported high 
unit labour costs, high inflation, and domestic demand/import dependent patterns of 
economic growth into the periphery. Within such an arrangement, the eurozone periphery 
fulfils a crucial role for Germany’s model of growth, as Bellofiore notes that Germany has a 
‘historical need to export to Southern Europe, where it realised the largest part of its profits’ 
(2013,505). This is the crux of core-periphery analysis, ‘[t]he worsening of the current account 
balance of the peripheral countries emerges pari passu with the improving surplus of the 
central countries’ (Cesaratto and Stirati 2011, 59). For Lapavitsas et al., ‘[t]he euro is nothing 
less than a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy for Germany’ (2012, 30; Stiglitz 2016,253). 
Step-3: Capital account imbalances 
The third analytical step theorises the way in which EMU has led to enormous financial 
imbalances stemming from capital flows from the core to the periphery. The crisis originated 
in easier access for a number of peripheral states to European financial markets, due to the 
adoption of the euro, and the new financial and monetary institutions and innovations that 
accompanied such access (Cesaratto 2013, 114). Massive capital flows went from the core to 
the periphery, which funded credit-financed consumption growth in Spain and Ireland, and 
contributed to the growth of public spending in Greece (Cesaratto 2013, 114; Moravcsik 2012, 
5).  
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Germany is argued to have ‘recycled’ its current account surpluses into capital exports, 
‘primarily bank lending and foreign direct investment …the main recipient of which has been 
the eurozone, including the periphery’ (Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 4). This has had two important 
effects. Firstly, large capital inflows have resulted in capital account surpluses in the 
periphery, directly contributing to public and private indebtedness, precipitating the 
sovereign debt crisis (Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 5). Secondly, capital outflows from the core into 
the periphery have led to the promotion of financialised growth via investment bubbles and 
consumer booms. As such, the ‘export led model’ of growth in the core has directly led to the 
‘debt led’ model of growth in the periphery (Stockhammer 2012; Cesaratto 2013, 113). 
Accordingly, peripheral import dependency, and persistent external imbalances becomes 
financed, and thereby constantly reproduced by capital inflows from the core (Bellofiore et 
al. 2010, 136-7; Becker and Jäger 2012, 183). In other words, the current account surpluses 
that are necessary to the success of German neomercantalism, become financed by German 
lending to the periphery. This not only creates new vulnerabilities and fault lines for the 
periphery via the worsening of their balance of payments, but it also leads to the ‘destruction 
of their productive base[s]’ (Milios and Sotiropoulos 2010, 227).  
 
The limits of core-periphery analysis 
Core-periphery analysis is a highly influential critique of the immaturity thesis (Fouskas and 
Dimoulas 2013, 144), which makes it possible to argue that the current account deficits of the 
periphery have their origins in Berlin, not Athens. In other words, core and German 
dominance of the eurozone didn’t leave the so-called ‘PIIGS’ with any option but to build their 
economies out of straw. In a way that domestic-level accounts of the European periphery 
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tend not to, the literature reviewed above brings issues of German hegemony, current 
account imbalances, capital flows, and the unequal/hierarchical nature of EMU to the fore. 
Nevertheless, as important as these issues are, core-periphery analysis suffers from some 
serious empirical limitations, as I now outline. 
Empirical limits I: Current account imbalances 
Claims that current account surpluses in the core are the ‘mirror’ of those in the periphery 
rest on three major assumptions. One, relative unit labour costs are the primary determinant 
of divergences in competitiveness between the core and periphery.  Two, most of German 
trade takes place within the eurozone and that the core ‘needs’ the periphery (Young and 
Semmler 2011, 9) to generate its current account surpluses. Three, the periphery ‘lost out’ on 
export market share to Germany/the core. This all seems intuitive, as figure 1 shows, because 
the eurozone is indeed clearly characterised by current account surpluses in the core, and 
deficits in the periphery.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]  
However, it is one thing to be able to recognise that the eurozone is characterised by deficit 
countries and surplus countries, and quite another to argue that one is responsible for the 
other (Milios and Sotiropoulos 2010, 227; Young and Semmler 2011; Dooley 2014). In this 
section I show that the assumed connection between Core/German current account 
surpluses and the deficits in the periphery is tenuous, for three reasons. 
First, unit labour costs aren’t everything. A growing literature shows that relative unit 
labour costs are a misleading explanation for the current account imbalances displayed in 
figure 1 (Storm 2015; 2016, Jones 2015; 2016, Wyplosz 2013), for two reasons. On the one 
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hand, Storm (2016) shows that export prices are far less responsive to changes in unit labour 
costs than core-periphery analysis assumes, making up less than 25 percent of the gross 
output price. Germany’s competitive advantage and current account surplus has much more 
to do with non-price (technology-based) competitiveness and its superior links to trading 
partners in the core and outside of Europe (such as with the USA and China) (Storm 2016, 7-
8). On the other hand, current account deficits in the periphery are more likely a sign of a 
growth in imports, fuelled by capital inflows, than a fall in exports. This is evidenced, by Storm, 
through the fact that current account deficits in the crisis countries precede rising unit labour 
costs (see Storm 2016, 7-8).13  
Second, German exports to most countries in the eurozone periphery are in fact 
marginal, and are unlikely to account for the imbalances posited by Lapavitsas et al.  (Milios 
and Sotiropoulos 2010, 234-5; Dooley 2014, 945; Bastasin 2012, 156, 157). Core-periphery 
literature tends to overlook country specific balances of trade. For example, if the periphery 
were structurally necessary to Germany or other core economies as a market for its exports, 
we would expect that trade to peripheral economies, such as Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain, 
and Italy would be significant. However, as I show in figure 2, the reality is much more 
complicated. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]  
Figure 2 shows Germany’s trade balances with its top three partners, the four bailout 
countries, plus ‘guilty by association’ Italy for the boom period 2003-2007. It shows that most 
of the peripheral eurozone countries account for a marginal percentage of Germany’s trade 
surplus since the introduction of the euro. In fact, whereas the top three destinations of 
German exports (France, the US, and UK) account for  52.16 percent of the German trade 
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surplus, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece account for only 3.03 per cent of Germany’s overall 
trade surplus, and in fact, this includes a small trade deficit with Ireland. However, it must be 
noted that Germany has a considerably higher trade surplus with both Spain (13.49 percent) 
and Italy (10.77 percent) than the other three peripheral countries considered here, and when 
accounting for this, the five peripheral economies account for 27.29 percent of Germany’s 
trade surplus altogether, or just about half of the contribution from core and extra-EMU 
trading partners. This is clearly substantial, but nevertheless, reflects the relative importance 
core-EMU and extra-EU partners. Spain and Italy are the next most important, but deficits in 
Portugal, Ireland, and Greece can in no way be said to be the ‘mirror’ of Germany’s surplus. 
 The picture is complicated further by exploring the rest of the core, as figures 3-5 
show.14  
[Insert Figure 3 here]. 
[Insert figure 4 here]. 
[Insert Figure 5 here]. 
 Belgium (Figure 3), the Netherlands (Figure 4), and Finland (Figure 5) are all surplus 
countries. Belgium’s top three trade surpluses come from France (20.24 billion dollars, or 
110.19 percent of its world surplus), Germany (9.41 billion dollars; 51.21 percent), and Italy 
(6.87 billion dollars; 37.42 percent). Belgium also runs a substantial trade surplus against 
Spain (6.75 billion dollars; 36.75 percent). Greece accounts for 10.5 percent of Belgium’s 
world surplus (1.93 billion dollars), Portugal for 2.85 percent (0.52 billion dollars), and Belgium 
has a relatively huge trade deficit of 15.53 billion dollars with Ireland (or -84.53 percent of its 
world surplus). The Netherlands (Figure 4) has large trade surpluses with Germany (39.56 
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billion; 91.23 percent of world surplus), France (21.57 billion; 49.75 percent) and Belgium 
(18.34 billion; 42.30 percent). Similar to the other three core cases, Italy (15.15 billion; 34.95 
percent) and Spain (8.86 billion; 20.44 percent) make substantial contributions to the Dutch 
world surplus. Greece (2.77 billion; 6.39 percent of its world surplus), Portugal (1.81 billion; 
4.17 percent), and Ireland (0.89 billion of a trade deficit; -2.06 percent of surplus) feature as 
relatively small in comparison. Similar to the others, Finland has a relatively large trade 
surplus with Spain (1.0 billion; 11.43 percent of Finland’s world surplus), much smaller 
surpluses with Greece (0.26 billion; 2.93 percent), Italy (0.19 billion; 2.19 percent), Portugal 
(0.06 billion; 0.64 percent), and a small deficit with Ireland (0.21 billion; -2.37 percent). 
In spite of being a deficit country, France is included as part of the ‘core’ in most core-
periphery analysis, including Lapavitsas et al. (2012). Austria and Luxembourg are similar 
examples of ‘Northern’ or core deficit countries.15 As Table 1 shows, France’s top three 
positive trade balances are with the United Kingdom (8.58 billion; 1.82 percent of total 
exports), Spain (8.55 billion; 1.81 percent of total exports), and the United States (6.78 billion; 
1.44 percent of total exports). France runs a small trade surplus with Greece of 3.32 billion 
(0.70 percent of total exports), and a smaller surplus with Portugal of 1.08 billion (0.23 
percent).  France has a trade deficit with Ireland of 3.59 billion (or -0.76 percent of total 
exports), and France has 1.4 billion of a trade deficit with Italy (or -0.3 percent of total 
exports). Aside from a relatively large surplus vis-à-vis Spain, France’s trade relationship with 
the periphery is a varied tale of small deficits and smaller surpluses.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Austria’s top three positive trade balances (Table 1) are with the United States (4.2 
billion; 3.27 percent of total exports), Italy (2.6 billion; 2.03 percent of total exports) and the 
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United Kingdom (2.5 billion; 1.98 percent of total exports). Austria has a relatively large 
surplus with Spain of 1.98 billion (1.54 percent of total exports), and a smaller surplus with 
Greece (0.59 billion; 0.46 percent) and Portugal (0.27 billion; 0.21 percent of total exports), 
and like the other cases, a deficit with Ireland (0.19 billion; -0.15 percent of total exports). For 
Luxembourg (Table 1), France (1.01 billion; 5.32 percent of total exports), the UK (0.95 billion; 
5.03 percent of total exports), and Italy (0.95 billion; 5.0 percent of total exports) are the top 
three positive trade balances, with Spain close behind (0.93 billion; 4.91 percent of total 
exports). Portugal (0.23 billion; 1.24 percent of total exports), and Greece (0.09 billion; 0.49 
percent of total exports) are again relatively small, and Luxembourg runs a trade deficit 
against Ireland of 0.03 billion (-0.17 percent of total exports). For these three northern deficit 
countries, Italy and Spain tend to contribute relatively significant positive balances (although 
France runs a deficit with Italy), Portugal and Greece contribute modest or minor positive 
balances, and Ireland contributes to their deficits. Crucially, for France, Austria, and Belgium, 
there is no overall trade surplus for the periphery to contribute to. 
 Taking these seven cases together reveals a more complex picture than the ‘beggar-
thy-neighbour’ dynamic core-periphery analysis proposes. Core EMU tends to generate 
substantial trade surpluses vis-à-vis certain peripheral countries, namely the large economies 
of Spain and Italy. However, it is core EMU, non-EMU, and non-EU trading partners which are 
most important in each case. Crucial ‘crisis’ countries such as Greece barely feature as source 
of trade surpluses, or as positive trade balances. The same goes for Portugal, and Ireland 
generates trade surpluses against each core country.  While the figures for Spain and Italy are 
far from insignificant, in terms of visible balances of trade, it is clearly misleading to argue 
that peripheral current account deficits are the ‘structural mirror’ of core ‘surpluses’. This is 
18 
 
intuitive when it is considered that Germany’s balance of trade did not decline from 2009 
onwards, as would be expected, based on the premises of the core-periphery thesis and, 
given the collapse of the propensity to consume across the eurozone periphery (Milios and 
Sotirpoulos 2010, 235). On the contrary, German trade flourished during the crisis, precisely 
because its trading partners in the core of Europe, and outside the eurozone, are much more 
important to its current account surplus that the relatively small economies of the eurozone 
periphery (Reisenbichler and Morgan 2013; Beck 2013).16 At best, core-periphery argument 
can show evidence for a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ dynamic at play in Spain and Italy, but it 
certainly cannot explain the crucial cases of Greece, Portugal, and Ireland, who were each at 
the epicentre of the crisis. 
 Even if core-periphery analysis cannot say that the periphery is of any great 
importance to the generation of core surpluses, they could perhaps develop another 
argument which highlights the role that Germany and the core play in the generation of 
peripheral deficits. Yet, if we are to look at what percentage of trade deficits of each 
peripheral country comes from Germany and the core, the evidence for a beggar-thy-
neighbour dynamic is much stronger in some countries than it is in others. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
For the period 2003-2007, almost half of Portugal’s (Table 2) trade deficit results primarily 
from trade with the periphery. Spain accounts for 36.62 percent (8.46 billion dollars) of 
Portugal’s deficit, while Italy accounts for 8.77 percent (2.03 billion). Germany is highly 
significant as the second biggest deficit (3.72 billion or 16.10 percent of the world deficit), but 
is nevertheless almost 20 percent lower than Spain. Belgium, France, Austria, Luxembourg 
and Finland are each relatively marginal. As already mentioned, Ireland (Table 2) has an 
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overall trade surplus, and trade surpluses with each of the core countries considered here. Of 
its top three trade deficits, none are in the eurozone, and only one (the UK at 5.84 billion 
dollars; -14.89 percent of its surplus) is (during the period 2003-2007) a member of the 
European Union. However, in the case of Greece (Table 2) Germany is a clearly significant 
source of the former’s trade deficit (5.86 billion dollars or 13.8 percent of world deficit). Yet, 
fellow peripheral country Italy is a close second at 5.68 billion dollars or 13.38 percent of 
Greece’s world deficit, and Russia features prominently also (3.46 billion dollars; 8.15 
percent). Germany and core Europe make up 35 per cent of Greece’s overall trade deficit, 
which is highly significant, but far from the whole story. 
As mentioned, Germany does run significant trade surpluses with Spain and Italy. This 
is reflected in the sources of Italy’s and Spain’s trade deficits (Table 2). Germany represents 
17.32 billion of Italy’s deficit (178.08 percent of Italy’s world deficit), and The Netherlands 
(13.34 billion; 137.14 percent) and Belgium (6.53 billion; 67.15 percent) are highly important 
to Italy’s overall deficit. However, Italy runs a large trade surplus with France of 6.93 billion 
dollars (-71.24 percent of the Italian trade deficit). Spain is slightly more ambiguous. Although 
Germany represents the largest individual portion of Spain’s deficit (24.23 billion), it 
nevertheless amounts to 25.47 percent of the overall deficit, which is far less than Italy’s trade 
deficit with Germany. China (10.95 billion; 11.5 percent) and Italy (7.97 billion; 8.37 percent) 
are the second largest sources of Spain’s deficit and the core accounts for 45.6 percent of 
Spain’s deficit collectively.  
 Taking all of these deficits together, there is no disputing the importance of Germany 
and the core in the generation of trade deficits in Spain and especially in Italy. Yet, these 
countries are far less important in the generation of deficits in Portugal and are irrelevant in 
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Ireland. Germany and the core are a significant part of Greece’s trade deficit, but so too are 
Italy, Russia, and a whole host of other countries which account for the substantial remainder 
of its deficit. Naturally, we might expect the relatively large economies of Germany and the 
core to feature more prominently in the trade deficits of the periphery than relatively tiny 
Greece, Portugal, and Ireland would feature in the trade surpluses of the core. What is 
surprising is just how often Germany and the core do not dominate these balances.  
Finally, the related notion that Germany has overwhelmed the competitiveness of 
peripheral countries thereby robbing them of export market share can be challenged. In 
reality, the competitiveness problems faced by countries of the European periphery are far 
more complex and varied than can be captured by relative increases in unit labour unit costs 
vis-a-vis Germany. Taking three examples, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland, clearly illustrates 
this.  
Greece’s competitiveness problems long predate the euro. As Louri and Minoglou put 
it, the country ‘never fully completed the transition from a backward mercantile/agricultural 
economy to an advanced capitalist economy’ (2002, 324, 337). Even at its peak, industrial 
employment in Greece was 30% as opposed to roughly 47% for other Western economies. By 
1994 the share of manufacturing output in GDP was 15 per cent, down from 19.8 per cent in 
1951 (Louri and Minoglou 2002, 338). Long standing declining fortunes of Greek 
manufacturing and industrial sectors, resulted in economic activity shifting conclusively to 
domestic consumption and other non-tradable activities (Markantonatou 2012, 423). When 
Greece did witness economic growth during the 1990s and 2000s, the sectors of the economy 
that drove growth were inward-looking and driven by domestic demand. Since at least the 
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1970s, Greece effectively had no export or industrial sector which could have been 
undermined by German competitiveness. 
While Germany excels in mostly complex, high-tech exports (Storm 2016), Portugal’s 
exports have historically been concentrated in ‘traditional sectors’, especially in textiles, 
clothing and footwear. This industry has been contracting across Europe since the 1970s in 
the face of fierce competition from low-cost manufacturers in East Asia, North Africa, Eastern 
Europe and other areas (Corkill 2002, 158; Lains 2007). Portugal’s international 
competitiveness became threatened, not by Germany or core-Europe (which were by no 
means challengers to Portugal’s particular export base), but rather by China’s entry into the 
WTO and the ending of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement in 200517 (Serra 2014, 43). Additionally, 
nascent attempts at developing a more advanced export sector in medium-tech 
manufacturing were stunted by the prospect of European enlargement and competition from 
the CEECs.18 For Portugal, it was extra-EU economies, and fellow ‘peripheral’ European 
economies (the CEECs) that represented a threat to its international competitiveness, not the 
core as Lapavitsas et al. (2012) and others working within the core-periphery perspective 
suggest. 
Ireland is typically and unsatisfyingly explained away as an outlier to the ‘periphery’ 
proper (see Lapavitsas et al. 2012; Magone, Laffan, and Schweiger 2016) precisely because it 
can’t be said to have experienced the same problems with international competitiveness as 
Greece and Portugal.  As Martin Sandbu (2017) notes, the Irish government was put under 
particular pressure by the ECB to issue a notorious bank guarantee of €440 billion 19, which 
undoubtedly played a key role in making Ireland’s debt appear unsustainable to international 
markets (see Whelan 2014). Ireland differs from the rest of the periphery in another respect. 
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From the mid-1990s onwards, its economy grew at a rate of three times the European average 
and within four years its unemployment rate more than halved. Stunningly, this growth was 
export-led and driven by a high profile, high-tech manufacturing sector, not to mention 
achieved with some of the lowest levels of public debt and spending in the continent. Ireland’s 
downturn has more to do with the emergence of a speculative property bubble and less to 
do with declining export competitiveness.  In any event, few are comfortable with relying on 
notions of German competitiveness to explain the origins of the Irish economic crisis. Yet, this 
qualification needs to be taken further. Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy have varied 
and complex histories which explain the status of their international competitiveness. No 
single case fits neatly into an explanation that insists upon the analytical primacy of German 
or core competitiveness in the periphery’s current account deficits.20  
None of what is discussed here should be understood as denying the benefits 
Germany has enjoyed, perhaps uniquely, from the construction of EMU. As I show in section 
three, core-periphery analysis correctly identifies the problems of a one-size-fits-all model of 
European integration in ‘Step-1’ of its analysis. Yet this is beside the point. What is at stake is 
the ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ thesis – and the trade balances and specific histories presented 
here highlight the serious problems in blaming Germany for the periphery’s competitiveness 
vulnerabilities.  
Empirical limits II: Capital flows 
Although the above raises significant problems for ‘Step-2’ of the core-periphery analysis, a 
modified version of the ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ argument can still be made by looking at 
capital account imbalances.21 Lapavitsas et al. correctly identify that ‘Germany has been 
exporting capital on a large scale, while peripheral countries have been importing capital 
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(2012, 31). Even if Germany and the rest of the core are not generating a current account 
surplus from trade with the periphery, and even if it is not ‘necessary’ for the core to direct 
massive capital flows to the periphery, the fact that it is doing so, could still be a major cause 
of the crisis in the periphery (Cesaratto 2013, 113). Lapavitsas et al. demonstrate that flows 
from the core to periphery during the period have actually become ‘more important in size’ 
than any other type of capital flows in the eurozone, at least from 2005-2009 (2012, 46, 47). 
However, this argument needs to be unpacked carefully. To highlight the relative importance 
of core-periphery capital flows, Lapavitsas et al. have grouped the same four countries into 
the ‘core’ (Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands) and ‘periphery’ (Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain), and it is between these two groups of countries, rather than 
between specific countries that the core-periphery relationship, in terms of bank lending and 
capital flows, has been established (Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 46). As was the case with ‘Step-2’, 
the relationship is not so clear-cut if we look at specific country-to-country relations. 
[INSERT FIGURES 6 AND 7 HERE] 
As figures 6-11 illustrate, the patterns of cross border lending within the eurozone are 
not so clearly reducible to a German ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ dynamic once we examine the 
countries on a case by case basis.22 Germany is the most important lender only in the case of 
Spain, but not in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, or Greece. Indeed, as Thompson (2013) notes, 
German exposure is less than France in the case of Greece, and in total (8). Moreover, once 
we unpack the complexities of capital flows in each case, while the fact of high German 
exposure cannot be disputed, the case for German lending being more important to the 
origins of crisis in the periphery than other countries is seriously undermined. 
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Disaggregating capital flows from groups of ‘core’ economies to groups of ‘peripheral’ 
economies reveal some important challenges to core-periphery analysis. For example, in the 
case of Portugal (figure 6), we can see that although Germany is heavily exposed to the 
country (meaning that an average of US$ 39,538mn of capital flowed from Germany to 
Portugal for the period 2005-2009, an average of 19.0 percent of total claims); capital inflows 
from fellow peripheral economy Spain are close to twice as high, at an average of 32.9 Percent 
of total claims, or US$68,215 for the same period. Additionally, the combined amount of 
average capital inflows from France (US$25,174mn) and the UK (US$20,816mn) exceed the 
amount from Germany at 21.8 percent of total claims. In the case of Ireland (figure 7), 
neighbouring UK is the most important lender (an average of 27 per cent of total claims, or 
US$163,774.70mn, for 2005-2009), edging ahead of Germany at 26 percent 
(US$159,411.10mn) of total claims for this particular period. Germany is indisputably a major 
lender to Ireland, and 50 per cent of the time, Germany or the UK will be the biggest lender 
to Ireland for a given quarter during the time frame. Nevertheless, singling out the importance 
of German, rather than UK banks for the case of Ireland is somewhat arbitrary. 
[Insert Figures 8, 9, 10 & 11 HERE]  
In the case of Greece (figure 8), Germany is the second most important lender at an average of 18 
percent of total claims (US$38,976mn from 2005-2009) falling behind France at 20. 8 percent 
(US$50,895mn). However, Germany is clearly the most important lender to Spain (figure 9) (average 
of 27.5 percent of total claims or US$223,519mn from 2005-2009) with France and the UK as distant, 
yet still important second and third (averages of 17. 4 percent; US$143,073mn and 13.9 percent; 
US$110,697mn respectively). The case of Italy (figure 10) is particularly important for two reasons. 
First, France dwarves Germany as the most important lender (average of US$341,417mn, or 31.1 
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percent of total claims; much larger than Germany’s US$209,615mn or 20.6 percent of total claims). 
Second, as figure 11 shows, Italy actually lends more than it borrows from Germany (Italy lends an 
average of US$223,900mn to Germany and borrows US$209,615mn from it – 12.5 percent of 
Germany’s total claims).    
Naturally, none of this should be seen as denying the significant impact or implications of 
German or core exposure to the periphery.23 If Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium are 
grouped together, Lapavitsas et al’s claims about the ‘core’ are absolutely correct. There is no 
disputing the importance of core flows to the periphery, and it is remarkable that the same core 
countries seem to feature in each case. Even more clearly, these figures support the argument of 
Thompson (2013) that Germany’s problematic response, itself a major cause of the eurozone crisis, 
can be criticised and explained by fears underpinned by the interests of its powerful banking sector 
over significant exposure to the periphery. Germany’s real concern was Italy and Spain, and German 
actions can be understood as aiming to prevent contagion to those countries (Thompson 2013;2015). 
Germany’s problematic response to the debt crisis protected German banks at considerable cost to 
the periphery, and Germany managed to reduce its exposure to the periphery by more than half 
between 2009 and 2012; a rate unparalleled by any other core economy (Thompson 2015, 859-860). 
Nothing that is said here disputes this important critique being levelled at Germany. 
However, the central point remains that analysing these flows through a ‘core-periphery’ 
prism can be limiting, leading to the omission of important specificities in relation to ‘peripheral’ 
cases, so as to occasion important blind spots in the understanding of the how crisis has originated, 
as distinct to how it has been responded to (Dooley 2014, 945).24 One such blind spot is the under-
appreciated salience of inter-periphery financial flows (such as the importance of Italian lending to 
Germany, and Spanish lending to Portugal). Another is the importance of exposure to a variety of 
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different countries as illustrated by the above figures (especially the UK, Netherlands, and the USA). 
Another issue is that while core-periphery lending can be posited as important, there is little reason 
to single out the role of Germany, as most core-periphery literature does. Only in one case, Spain, is 
Germany the most important lender to the periphery. It is certainly true that capital flowed from the 
more developed financial centres of Northern Europe to Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Italy. It is far 
less apparent that this fact supports the tale of the German ‘big bad wolf’, while Spanish, British, and 
French banks have all been lending more to these four countries than Germany.  Financial and trade 
imbalances are certainly crucial to any understanding of the crisis in the European periphery, but 
more is obscured than revealed by contorting these multiple flows into a simplistic core-periphery 
model. 
  
Beyond the German ‘Big Bad Wolf’ 
The problems facing core-periphery analysis can be summed up in the single observation that 
the crisis of the European periphery is not reducible to German dominance alone (Dooley 
2014, 945). Even when core-periphery analysis acknowledges the role played by multiple core 
countries, it tends to be Germany that is given the sensationalist ‘headline grabbing’ 
treatment. This scapegoating of Germany echoes the empirical limitations of the ‘immaturity 
thesis’ which blames the ‘lazy PIIGS’. In this section I show that by jettisoning ‘beggar-thy-
neighbour’ narratives and engaging with the literature on comparative political economy 
(CPE), a more fruitful research agenda on the origins of the eurozone crisis can be opened up: 
namely, one which shows that Germany is not the ultimate source of the eurozone crisis, but 
rather the institutions of EMU and the Single Market have been set up in a way that favours 
the core while disadvantaging the periphery (Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 2-4).  
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I show this in two main ways. First, step-2 of core-periphery analysis is empirically 
lacking because it assumes, but don’t convincingly demonstrate a link between German 
economic ‘domination’ and current account deficits in the periphery. Yet, step-1 of core-
periphery analysis, in dialogue with CPE scholars such as Alison Johnston and Bob Hancké, can 
show how EMU was constructed in such a way that advantaged the Coordinated Market 
Economies (CMEs) of the core while disadvantaging the Mixed Market Economies (MMEs) of 
the periphery. 
Second, step-3 of core-periphery analysis is correct to stress the importance of capital 
flows from core-Europe to the periphery, but undue focus on Germany and a lack of country 
specificity oversimplifies the very different forms of indebtedness experienced by the 
individual countries of the periphery. However, step-1, informed by CPE, can show how 
capital flows will impact differently on different varieties of capitalism. I conclude that a 
critique directed at the institutional set up of the Single Market and EMU is more convincing 
than the tale of the German ‘big bad wolf’, and that the tools to do so are contained within 
‘step-1’ of core-periphery analysis.  
Back to ‘Step-1’: Comparative Political Economy and Competitiveness 
As mentioned earlier, the ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ relationship between ‘export-led’ models 
and ‘debt-led’ models is not analytically necessary to account for their emergence in the first 
place. It is possible to develop an alternative departure point from ‘step-1’ of core-periphery 
analysis that recognises the role of European integration as a catalyst for diverging models of 
development , but moves away from reliance on ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ notions.  
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Step-1 of core-periphery analysis recognises that the diverse institutional models of 
the core and periphery reacted differently under the conditions of European integration (see 
Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 23-28). This focus on capitalist diversity is implicit, yet under-theorised 
in the work of much core-periphery analysis, especially from within critical IPE which tends 
(for many good reasons)25 be critical of CPE literature such as Varieties of Capitalism. For 
instance, Lapavitsas et al. (2012, 5) argue that once peripheral countries were ‘confronted’ 
with German competitiveness, they adopted alternative strategies of growth based on their 
own specific histories.  However, Lapavitsas doesn’t elaborate, analytically, how this 
‘confrontation’ operates; moving on quickly to steps 2 and 3. This elaboration matters. 
Engaging with CPE literature can draw out the potential of ‘step-1’ of core-periphery analysis 
in the following ways. 
First, the work of Johnston (2016) and Hancké (2013) stresses the role of different 
kinds of wage bargaining systems in the core CMEs and peripheral MMEs and links these 
different national institutions to the design flaws of EMU.  In Germany, institutions developed 
gradually over time which facilitated comprehensive wage restraint, price competitiveness, 
and an export profile in complex, high-tech manufacturing, something Lapavitsas et al. and 
Moravcsik also recognise.26  On the other hand, different histories of institution building 
meant that Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and Italy were not able to repeat this fate, in 
particular due to very different industrial heritages, a lack of a wage coordination tool, and 
due to the strength of (certain) labour unions (Nölke 2015, 7-8; cf Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 23). 
Johnston (2016) and Hancké (2013) show how once in the euro, core CMEs were able to 
control wage growth in non-sheltered sectors, while peripheral MMEs lacked the institutional 
tools to do the same. Current account and capital account imbalances would not have been 
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a persistent problem before EMU, but pivotal institutions were taken away from the 
periphery: national central banks that were averse to inflation and tight fiscal rules at an EU 
level that would disincentivise inflation (Johnston 2016).  
Second, different national institutional contexts create different ‘comparative 
advantages’ between core and peripheral economies. Export-oriented economies such as 
Germany have an advantage in building up incremental innovations in high-quality 
manufacturing, ‘based on a sophisticated system of skill formation, in particular through 
vocational training’ but also through relative job security and traditions in long term 
investment practices (Nölke 2015, 10). Peripheral economies typically have more of an 
advantage in the production of low to medium quality goods which rest on a more uneven 
system of skill formation. This has a number of consequences, not least of which are the 
relative price sensitivity of peripheral-type goods, and their vulnerability to competition from 
emerging economies outside of the EU single market (Nölke 2015, 10). Moreover, extra EU 
demand for EU goods is typically stronger for advanced German products, and much lower 
for the low-medium goods produced by peripheral economies (Nölke 2015).  
A focus on national institutional contexts under a flawed in design EMU helps to 
explain why certain countries of the European periphery have generated current account 
deficits over the decades. What is clear is from step-1 and CPE is that peripheral deficits are 
not constituted by core surpluses, but rather, are asymmetric responses to the common 
pressure of a one-size-fits-all monetary union. Step-1 of core-periphery analysis can deepen 
our understandings of the role of different national institutional contexts in the origins of the 
eurozone crisis through in-depth case study research, as opposed to the externalist 
framework entailed by steps 2 and 3 of the perspective. 
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Capital Flows 
Core-periphery analysis correctly emphasises the role of capital flows in contributing to the 
overheating and indebtedness of the European periphery. Furthermore, it is indisputable that 
these flows were largely core-periphery in direction. However, a preoccupation with ‘beggar-
thy-neighbour’ assumptions leads to at least two important limitations.  
First, core-periphery analysis is correct to emphasise the role of capital flows, but 
undue attention on the role of Germany recycling current account surpluses leads to 
important blind spots in the timing of these capital flows.27 Jones (2016) and Storm (2016) 
show how current account imbalances actually resulted from a growth in imports while the 
trend growth of exports in the periphery remained largely unchanged, even in spite of 
relatively rising unit labour costs (Storm 2016, 10). The European periphery first experienced 
debt-led growth boom during and in anticipation of the euro, which led to higher imports, 
capital inflows, overheating of non-tradeable sectors – and ultimately a widening current 
account deficit (Storm 2016; Jones 2016). As figure 12 shows, private sector debt in the 
periphery was growing as early as 1995, with countries such as Portugal reaching private debt 
to GDP ratios of over 100 per cent by 1998 (Dooley 2017). The crisis in the European periphery 
was likely to materialise whether or not Germany undercut the competitiveness of the 
periphery because of growing dependence of firms, households, and governments across the 
European periphery on cheap credit (Jones 2015, 45).  
Second, although the EMU-core can still be criticised in their role as ‘irresponsible 
lenders’, I have shown that core-periphery analysis needs to pay closer attention to the 
specificities of each case. Section two has shown how individual peripheral countries show 
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very different patterns of cross-border capital flows (figures 6-11). Greater specificity is 
required as Germany is the most important lender only in the case of Spain. 
In addition, it is worth noting that some CPE approaches, especially Varieties of 
Capitalism, have been criticised for an excessive focus on ‘competitiveness’ problems at the 
expense of the financial account (see especially Jones 2016). Core-periphery analysis has 
faced similar criticisms (especially from Storm 2015, 2016). Jones forensically demonstrates 
how countries did not get into crisis simply because they lost competitiveness (2015), but 
rather, because European financial integration allowed rapid flows of capital to transform 
peripheral economies throughout the 1990s and 2000s before drying up just as suddenly after 
2008 (Jones 2016). CPE is perhaps better at accounting for why the adjustment process to the 
crisis has been so difficult for the periphery, and less successful at explaining its origins in the 
first place.28 Yet, while it is true that many CPE scholars (Jones mentions Hancké in particular) 
neglect the financial account, others emphasise it. As Lapavitsas and Powell (2013), Rodrigues 
et al. (2016), and others29 demonstrate, financialisation did not affect European economies 
homogenously (Engelen et al. 2010). The very different forms of crisis facing the periphery 
suggest that an attentiveness to the interplay between financialisation, national specific 
institutions, and competitiveness is crucial to a deeper understanding of the eurozone crisis. 
With this in mind, step-1 of core-periphery analysis can link this discussion of capital 
flows to an understanding that some member states were more vulnerable than others 
because of their particular growth regime (Regan 2015; Lapavitsas and Powell 2013).30 Step-
1 and certain strands of CPE approaches (such as Lapavitsas and Powell 2013) can allow us to 
recognise that “the form and the content taken by financialisation var[ies] according to 
institutional, historical and political conditions o[f different countries]”. (Lapavitsas and 
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Powell 2013). Core economies such as the UK and Germany were able to adapt successfully 
to increasing capital flows following the introduction of the euro. This external pressure 
reinforced already existing institutional complementarities. The periphery on the other hand 
were in a much weaker position, and were lacking in the institutions that economies such as 
the USA and the UK had built up over the course of three decades which focused their 
economies on the provision of innovative financial services, (Regan 2015; Nölke 2015, 14). 
Instead, the periphery developed a dependency on foreign capital, and due to long standing 
trends towards deindustrialisation, economic activity moved towards finance, real estate and 
construction, and often from production for export to the management of imports (Nölke 
2015, 14).  
The very different effects of cross-border capital flows are reflected by the different 
locational sources of debt (figures 6-11), but also in the very different kinds of crisis 
experienced by the periphery.  
[Insert figures 12 and 13 here] 
As figure 12 and 13 show, important differences are reflected in levels of private and public 
debt across the periphery. Spain and Ireland had, on average, lower public debt to GDP ratios 
than Germany (figure 13). Yet, from about 2003-2008, aggressive lending by the Irish banking 
system propelled a property boom during this period, which began to overwhelm all other 
sectors of the economy (Lane 2012, 2).   Similar to Spain, Ireland’s experience of cross-border 
capital flows is most clearly a speculative property bubble.  
But it is important to recognise that this sets Ireland and Spain apart from the likes of 
Portugal and Greece.  Portugal exhibited relatively higher levels of public debt to both 
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Germany and Spain and Ireland, but never approached the levels of Greece or Italy. Portugal’s 
levels of private debt began to rise substantially much earlier than its fellow peripheral 
countries as evidenced by its current account deficit in figure 1, and private debt to GDP ratio 
in figure 12. Portuguese household indebtedness was well above the euro area average of 80 
per cent and Credit growth accelerated (in real terms) from close to 0% in 1990 to above 25% 
in 1998 (European Commission 2004; Lagoa 2014; Dooley 2017).  Yet, unlike the rest of the 
periphery, Portugal experienced anaemic growth from the early 2000s onwards – due in part 
to the relative over-indebtedness of households and firms vis-a-vis the euro area average at 
this time.31 
Greece’s high public debt-to-GDP ratios are well known, and crucially, unparalleled in 
the rest of the EMU periphery (figure 13).  However, this is not all that sets Greece apart. In 
terms of private debt (figure 12), Spain, Ireland, and Portugal all overshoot Italy and Greece 
by almost 100 points in 2009.  Greece had a relatively underdeveloped and poorly integrated 
banking sector, ending up with one of the lowest levels of private and household debt in the 
eurozone and. Unlike Ireland and Spain, Greece was quite clearly not a banking crisis (see 
Pagoulatos and Triantopoulos 2009).  
In sum, the observation that capital flowed from the core to the periphery of Europe 
is an important one. But undue focus on Germany leads to major blind spots. Future research 
needs to move towards a more fine-grained analysis of the impact of a one size fits all project 
of financial integration on different varieties of capitalism in the core and periphery, and not 
the domination of the core on the periphery. 
Rethinking the core and periphery in European integration 
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In this section I proposed a rethinking of core-periphery analysis. The crisis in the European 
periphery is not a story of Germany ‘steam-rolling’ the periphery (Milios and Sotiropoulos, 
2010, 227). Rather, the key contribution of core-periphery analysis is that key institutions of 
European integration were disastrously ill-equipped to handle the integration of core and 
peripheral varieties of capitalism. We do not need beggar-thy-neighbour assumptions to 
recognise that a specific project of European integration may reflect the interests and work 
to the benefit of certain member states while disadvantaging others.   
The absence of ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ dynamics between core and periphery should 
in no way entail the shutting down of important debates about inequality and hierarchy 
within the EU and the eurozone, or regarding Germany’s possibly (re-)emergent role as a 
hegemon, reluctant or otherwise (Bulmer and Paterson 2013). Indeed, the important insights 
of ‘step-1’ of core-periphery analysis are arguably all the more compelling if the problematic 
steps 2 and 3 are left behind. For instance, the ‘beggar-thy-neighbour assumption’ is not 
necessary to Matthijs’ (2016b) argument that the euro crisis has led to the reversal of per 
capita income convergence between the core and periphery – as record low unemployment 
rates in Germany and Austria are contrasted to all-time highs in Greece and Spain (Matthijs 
2016b, 394). Matthijs (2016b), citing Kathleen McNamara (1998) points to the broad elite 
consensus around neoliberal ideas which defined the architecture of the Maastricht treaty, 
and thus, the Single Market and the euro. It is possible, in this type of analysis to ‘blame’ the 
core (as Matthijs does) for designing a ‘winner takes it all’ project of European integration, 
without resorting to beggar-thy-neighbour assumptions. Yet, more interestingly, Matthijs’ 
paper opens up interesting questions about how and why the periphery went along with this 
plan and how involved they were in developing this ‘elite consensus’ (see Dooley 2016). 
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Similarly, the work of Bulmer and Patterson (2013) on Germany’s hegemon status, Matthijs 
(2016a; 2016b) and Thompson (2013)’s critiques of Germany’s handling of the crisis could all 
be strengthened by engaging with an analysis of Germany’s role in the origins of the crisis 
that does not rely on problematic ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ assumptions. 
My argument has the potential to deepen these debates by inviting critical scholars to 
jettison empirically limited assumptions of ‘dependency’ and instead take the domestic 
origins of the crisis seriously, in a way that can also account for the design flaws of EMU and 
European integration itself. Fortunately, by drawing out what I have labelled as ‘step-1’ of 
core-periphery analysis, I have shown that the roots for doing so already exist within these 
critical approaches.  
Conclusion 
The contribution of this paper has been to highlight the definite need to rethink the role of 
Germany in the origins of the vulnerabilities of the European periphery, and accordingly, in 
the origins of the eurozone crisis itself. The crisis in the eurozone is not best understood as 
one of peripheral profligacy, misgovernment or cultural deficit. But neither is it as a crisis of 
German or even core economic domination. Rather, it is a crisis of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ project 
of European integration that the periphery was calamitously unable to adapt to. 
I have shown that core-periphery analysis singles out and overstates the role of 
Germany in the competitiveness and indebtedness problems of the countries of the European 
periphery, as well as the ‘structural role’ of the periphery for Germany/the core in its 
generation of trade surpluses and as a destination for capital outflows. The empirical case for 
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a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ relationship between the core/Germany and the periphery was 
exposed as seriously limited.  
Yet, core-periphery analysis was nevertheless shown to offer a potentially compelling 
alternative and critical account of the origins of the crisis in the periphery. Through 
interpreting core-periphery analysis as comprising three analytical steps, I argued that 
jettisoning the notions of German ‘beggaring its neighbour’ contained in steps 2 and 3 can 
deepen the claims made by ‘step-1’. Germany, Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy, and Portugal have 
dramatically different national institutional contexts, and a ‘one size fits all’ process of 
European integration has imposed different costs across these specific contexts. Rather than 
explaining away the varied experience of crisis across the periphery as a function of German 
or core power, the real potential of core-periphery analysis is to take these different contexts, 
and their interaction with a particular process of European integration, seriously. In this way 
core-periphery analysis should return to domestic-level analysis, but in a way that is attentive 
to the international, as well as the agency and the specificity of individual peripheral 
experiences. ‘Step-1’ of core-periphery analysis contains this potential, but it has been let 
down by a commitment to misleading ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ narratives. 
The rethinking of the origins of the eurozone crisis that this paper has introduced has 
important consequences for critical scholarship on the origins of the eurozone crisis, because 
while it allows us to recognise that notions of peripheral ‘immaturity’ are little more than, 
typically misleading heuristic devices (Brazys and Hardiman 2013); a genuine critical 
rethinking of the vulnerabilities of the so-called ‘PIIGS’ requires more than the addition of a 
‘big bad wolf’ if we are to finally move beyond the fairy tale of the ‘immaturity thesis’. 
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Figure 1: Current account balances for Germany, Spain, Greece, Italy, and Portugal (as a percentage of GDP) 
Source:: World Bank: Data Source indicated as International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics 
Yearbook and data files, and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates. 
 
 
Figure 2: Germany Trade Balances with Top 3 Partners and the Periphery: percentage of world 
surplus, average figures 2003-2007 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
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Figure 3: Belgium Trade Balances with Top 3 Partners and the Periphery: percentage of world 
surplus, average figures 2003-2007 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
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Figure 4: Netherlands Trade Balances with Top 3 Partners and the Periphery: percentage of world 
surplus, average figures 2003-2007 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
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Figure 5: Finland Trade Balances with Top 3 Partners and the Periphery: percentage of world surplus, 
average figures 2003-2007 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
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Figure 6: Portugal – Consolidated Foreign Claims, % of Total Claims 
Source: Bank for International Settlements Consolidated Bank Statistics 
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Figure 7: Ireland – Consolidated Foreign Claims, % of Total Claims 
Source: Bank for International Settlements Consolidated Bank Statistics 
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Figure 8: Greece – Consolidated Foreign Claims, % of Total Claims 
Source: Bank for International Settlements Consolidated Bank Statistics 
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Figure 9: Spain – Consolidated Foreign Claims, % of Total Claims 
Source: Bank for International Settlements Consolidated Bank Statistics 
 
Figure 10: Italy – Consolidated Foreign Claims, % of Total Claims 
Source: Bank for International Settlements Consolidated Bank Statistics 
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Figure 11: Germany – Consolidated Foreign Claims, % of Total Claims 
Source: Bank for International Settlements Consolidated Bank Statistics 
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Figure 12: Private sector debt, consolidated - percentage of GDP 
Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 13: General Government Debt to GDP Ratios 
Source: OECD 
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Table 1: Core ‘Deficit Countries’: Top 3 Positive Trade Balances and Trade Balances with Periphery in 
% of Total Exports  
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9
Greece Ireland Italy Spain Portugal Germany
55 
 
 1 2 3 Germa
ny 
Belgiu
m 
France Austria Luxemb
ourg 
Finla
nd 
Portuga
l (D) 
Spain 
36.62% 
Germany 
16.10% 
Italy 
8.77% 
16.10% 1.76% 1.63% 1.09% 0.48% 0.21% 
Greece 
(D) 
German
y 
13.8% 
Italy 
13.38% 
Russia 
8.15% 
13.8% 4.66% 6.89% 1.28% 0.63% 1.24% 
Italy (D) German
y 
178.08
% 
Netherla
nds 
137.14% 
China 
131.31% 
178.08% 67.15% -71.24% 10.28% 9.54% 3.89% 
Spain 
(D) 
German
y 
25.47% 
China 
11.5% 
Italy 
8.37% 
25.47% 5.06% 4.77% 1.18% 0.65% 1.10% 
Ireland 
(S) 
UK 
-14.9% 
Taiwan 
-4.16%  
China 
-2.18% 
 
5.07% 35.09% 9.75% 0.76% 0.28% 0.39% 
 
Table 2: European Periphery: top three negative trade balances plus balances with the core: average 
figures 2003-2007  
(D = % Overall Trade Deficit; S = % Overall Trade Surplus). 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
Notes 
1 An unfortunate acronym for the ‘bailed out’ countries: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. 
2 See Manolopoulos 2011; Magone 2004; Diamandouros 2011, and for critical overviews see (D. Papadimitriou 
and Zartaloudis 2014; Becker and Jäger 2012; Lyberaki and Tsakalotos 2002),93,95. 
3 Deeming it offensive, the Financial Times actually banned use of the acronym ‘PIIGS’ in its publications 
(Mackintosh 2010) as did Barclays Capital (Alloway 2010). 
4 See Elliott, Inman, and Smith 2013 and Independent Evaluation Office of the International Monetary Fund 
2016. 
5 Different typologies of the ‘core’ exist. In this paper I adopt Lapavitsas et. al’s list: Germany, France, Belgium, 
and the Netherlands. 
6 See Dullien and Guérot 2012; Moravcsik 2012; Matthijs and Blyth 2011; Thompson 2013; Bulmer and Paterson 
2013; Jacoby 2015; Newman 2015; Matthijs 2015, 6. 
7 See also Bulmer and Paterson 2013; Paterson 2011; Matthijs and Blyth 2015. 
8 Furthermore, the three strands tend not to talk much to each other. As an indication, Lapavitsas et al. (2012) 
are not cited a single time in Matthijs 2016a, Thompson 2013, or Bulmer and Patterson 2013, and even more 
remarkably, not a single publication from the above authors are cited in Flassbeck and Lapavitsas (2015). 
9 See Matthijs 2016b; Beck 2013; Goetz and Dyson 2003; Lapavitsas et. al. 2012, 3-5. 
10 On design flaws, see de Grauwe 2013, 6-7; Papadimitriou and Wray 2012,2-3; Panico and Purificato 2013; 
Scharpf 2011. 
11 It is also worth noting that while the analysis of Lapavitsas (et al. 2012; Flassbeck and Lapavitsas 2015) focuses 
on the relationship between the core (Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands) and the periphery, it is 
Germany that ends up being the primary focus. This is evidenced, inter alia, by chapter headings in Flassbeck 
and Lapavitsas most recent work like ‘Germany as the Source of the Eurozone crisis’ (2015, 21-38), not ‘Core 
EMU as the Source of the Eurozone crisis’, and the preoccupation with German wage moderation in Flassbeck 
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and Lapavitsas (heated) exchange with Storm (2016). While it would be unfair to say that the distinction between 
the core and Germany has been imprecise, Germany’s role in generating current and capital account imbalances 
is the one that steals the headlines in this literature. As I show in section two, this distinction between the core 
and Germany matters, as it has implications for how valid it is to blame the German ‘big bad wolf’ for the 
eurozone crisis. 
12 As I note in section three, this approach does not typically make a distinction between sheltered and non-
sheltered sectors of the economy. As Hopkin (2015) notes, inflation in the periphery tended to come from the 
sheltered not for export sector. 
13 See Storm 2015;2016 for more extensive account of this critique. 
14 Lapavitsas et al. (2012) consider Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands as the ‘core’. As per the 
suggestion of an anonymous peer reviewer, I have also included the cases of Finland, Austria, and Luxembourg. 
15 Because these countries are deficit countries, there is no overall trade surplus for the periphery to contribute 
to. Accordingly, positive trade balances are represented as percentages of total world exports, rather than as 
percentages of world surplus. 
16Of course, Germany benefitted from a weakened euro and increased demand from emerging markets. I thank 
an anonymous peer reviewer for stressing the importance of this point. 
17 The Multi-Fibre Arrangement was an international trade agreement on textile and clothing which imposed 
quotas on the amount that developing countries could export to developed countries. 
18 Including some emblematic projects such as a large car plant – see European Commission Directorate-General 
for Economic and Financial Affairs 2004, 24.  
19 See the infamous ‘Trichet letter’ to the late Finance Minister, Brian Lenihen; (Irish Times 2014).  
20 It is worth noting that the case of Spain, at face value, does appear to support Lapavitsas et al.’s (2012) claim. 
Yet, and although there is not the space to go into the case in any detail, Spain’s trade deficit stemmed more 
from an increase in imports brought about by a housing bubble (similar to Ireland), while export performance 
remained stable over the period of its euro membership (see Kang and Shambaugh 2013, 14). German 
‘victimisation’ tells us little about Spain’s crisis.  
21 As Milios and Sotiropoulos (2010) do, in spite of their critique of a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ core-periphery 
explanation. 
22 These figures are calculated using data from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) consolidated banking 
statistics. This data set provides information regarding banks’ on sheet financial claims vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world and provides a measure of the risk exposures of lenders’ national banking systems. This data set was 
chosen as Lapavitsas et al. (2012, 46-47) and Thompson (2013, 8) use BIS consolidated banking statistics to 
support their argument regarding the importance of core lending to the periphery. The time frame (2005-2009) 
was selected as BIS Consolidated Statistics do not contain data for ultimate risk basis before 2005, and Lapavitsas 
et al. (2012) use the same time period. 
23The case could be made that the ultimate source of Portuguese debt, indirectly, is Germany and France via 
Spain. However, rather than contort these relationships further into the core-periphery model (why would 
Germany indirectly lend to some peripheral states while directly lending to others?), I suggest that it makes 
more sense to take the specificities of financialisation in each state more seriously. 
24 Of course, the division between causes and responses is somewhat murky, because the problematic response 
to the crisis is a big part of the origin story. Nevertheless, we still need an understanding as to why the European 
periphery got into difficulty in the first instance. 
25 See Hancké 2009, 5-17; Clift 2014; Bruff and Ebenau 2014; and Coates 2014 for some up to date critical 
reviews. 
26 Lapavitsas et al. (2012, 22-28) make an argument that is very close to Johnston, but crucially, they do not 
recognise that wage rises tend not to emerge in the non-sheltered for-export sectors – as these already faced 
external market pressures to remain competitive. Rather rises in wage costs and inflation emerged from the 
sheltered sector of the economy  - where there was less pressure for wage moderation (Hopkin 2015, 175 
27 Although there is not space for a more detailed engagement with this approach, see Jones 2015;2016 and 
Storm 2015;2016 for an in-depth summary with evidence. 
28 I thank an anonymous peer reviewer for this point. 
29 See especially Engelen et al. (2010) who combine Varieties of capitalism literature with insights from 
‘financialisation studies’ in order to explain different geographies of financialisation in the USA, Germany, and 
the Netherlands. 
30 Lapavitsas and Powell (2013) have made this very point in reference to USA, UK, Germany, France and Japan. 
31 This draws on the more extensive account of Portugal’s financialisaton in Dooley (forthcoming). 
